Semi-presidentialism, premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism — A country-years dataset. Presidential power scores — A country years dataset. List of current semi-presidential countries. List of historic semi-presidential countries. List of president-parliamentary and premier-presidential semi-presidential countries. List of presidential and parliamentary countries.
Semi-presidentialism in disputed area or territories current and historic. List of periods of cohabitation. Visitors might also be interested in the following series of posts.
Please just follow the thread on the archives. When was the first reference to semi-presidentialism? What was the first semi-presidential country? Some difficult cases of semi-presidentialism. Over at the Presidential Power blogDavid Doyle and I have reported a set of presidential power scores. Scores for almost all semi-presidential countries are included. You can see how there is great variation in the presidential power scores across the set of countries with a semi-presidential constitution.
For example, you can see how Austria and Iceland are constitutionally president-parliamentary, but have very low presidential power scores. This confirms the idea that the definition of regime types is first and foremost a taxonomical exercise.
It depends on your theory, I suppose. The dataset uses the same country names, country years, and country ids. The dataset v2. This coding includes cases where a constitution requires a super-majority for the dismissal of the prime minister and cabinet by the legislature. In other words, this coding excludes cases where the PM and government can be held collectively accountable only through a super-majority vote in the legislature.
In sp1, the following countries are classed as semi-presidential, whereas in sp2 they are not: Algeria all yearsBurkina FasoBurundiCameroon all yearsCentral African RepublicEgyptKyrgyzstanMadagascar all SP years sinceMali all yearsRepublic of CongoRwanda all years sinceTogo all yearsTunisiaand Vietnam all years.
The presence of semi-presidentialism both sp1 and sp2 is coded as 1, its absence as 0. Codings da alcolismo in Borisov start year is the year of the introduction of semi-presidentialism in the constitution if the date is on or before 30 June. If the start date is 1 July or later, then the following year is recorded as the first full year of semi-presidentialism.
The end date is recorded for the year that the constitution ceased to be semi-presidential at whatever point in the year it ended. The end of semi-presidentialism is marked by a constitutional change. This can be a constitutional amendment introducing another type of system, or a suspension of codings da alcolismo in Borisov constitution.
This version also codes the premier-presidential and president-parliamentary sub-types of semi-presidentialism. The definitions are:. President-parliamentarism is a sub-type of semi-presidentialism where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to both the legislature and the president.
Premier-presidentialism is a sub-type codings da alcolismo in Borisov semi-presidentialism where codings da alcolismo in Borisov prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible solely to the legislature. These sub-types were first identified by Matthew Shugart and John Carey. The above definitions are consistent with Shugart and Carey In the dataset, pp1 and pp2 code premier-presidenetialism as 1 and president-parliamentarism as 2.
If a country codings da alcolismo in Borisov not semi-presidential, then the coding is 0. All pp1 codings are based on the definition of semi-presidentialism in sp1. All pp2 codings are based on the definition of semi-presidentialism in sp2. If there are any mistakes, then please let me know robert. If there are any questions, please contact me at the same email. Robert ElgieSemi-presidentialism, premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism — A new country-years codings da alcolismo in Borisov [Blog post, 3 April].
Elgie, R. Shugart, M. CareyPresidents and Assemblies. This post was first published at Presidential Power. Sophia Moestrup and I have just published another edited codings da alcolismo in Borisov on semi-presidentialism. Sophia and I contribute two chapters. This is a brief summary of this second chapter. The main attraction of institutional analysis is that it has the potential to generate better political outcomes.
Given the assumption that institutions matter, we may be able to craft them so as to mitigate or even eradicate some of the negative outcomes that would otherwise be caused by the behaviour of political actors. We wish to draw one institutional policy recommendation from this book. All else equal, countries with weaker presidents are likely to experience better outcomes than countries with stronger presidents.
That said, the shift to a weak president is relatively new, dating back to Kyrgyzstan also has a history of democratic reversals. So, we should avoid any definitive judgement at this early stage. More than that, the shift occurred in the context of the collapse of the previous regime and the desire on the part of the constitution builders to trammel the power of the presidency, which was seen as one codings da alcolismo in Borisov the main obstacles to democratic consolidation under the previous codings da alcolismo in Borisov.
This suggests that any positive effects of the weak presidency may be endogenous to the choice of the new institutional framework. These are positive signs. In Armenia, the decline in presidential power has been less dramatic.
Moreover, even after the passage of the reforms, the president still enjoyed some not inconsiderable constitutional powers. Further still, Armenia remains a hybrid democratic regime in which there is plenty of political competition, but where democratic procedures have been manipulated to the advantage of incumbent power holders, although perhaps less so in the most recent elections than previously.
In this context, we have to be careful about any codings da alcolismo in Borisov that we might we wish to draw from the Armenian case. Even so, we might benefit from thinking counterfactually. What would be the situation if there were now a super-president in Armenia? Would the situation be worse? We cannot know. Yet, we do know that in practice there was a form of super-presidentialism after the passage of the constitution.
We can also confidently claim that this period marked the low point of democratic performance in Armenia to date. Armenia has not experienced a weak presidency, but it has experienced very strong presidents. By far the strongest evidence, though, comes from Georgia. Here, there were two periods when the problem of endogenous institutional choice was at least partly offset because of a dramatic change in the political context.
In the first period there was a very strong president. In the second period, there was a very weak president. In this latter case, it is tempting to think in terms of quasi-experimental conditions.
In the same historical, cultural, economic, and social context, there was an institutional codings da alcolismo in Borisov, namely codings da alcolismo in Borisov move to a weak presidency. The result has been much better political performance. By contrast, the recent period under the weak presidency and a premier-presidential form of government has, to date, been characterized by much calmer relations.
Indeed, this latter period is doubly interesting because the president distanced himself from his former political allies immediately after his election. While there have been major disagreements between the president and the government, they have not become regime threatening. If we are right to conclude that weaker presidents are codings da alcolismo in Borisov presidents, then we also wish to assert that the party system is an important intervening variable, as indicated above.
It is perhaps no coincidence that in Georgia there has been a solid parliamentary majority since In other words, the president has not had the opportunity to try to offset his weak constitutional powers by building an alternative and potentially destabilizing pro-presidential codings da alcolismo in Borisov within the legislature.
We might add that there has also been a relatively stable legislative majority in Kyrgyzstan since the reforms. Again, the president has not had the incentive to craft a majority that is personally loyal to him and that often requires the distribution of state resources in a geographically skewed and perhaps even corrupt way.
In Armenia, by contrast, presidents have not always enjoyed a parliamentary majority and have been forced to forge coalitions in the legislature. This perhaps helps to account for the continued presence of a patronage president in a way that harms the rational functioning of the regime and democratic performance.
The introduction of a parliamentary system and a weak president should be a positive development on the basis of our logic, but it may merely be a way of maintaining patronage politics in the context of an uninstitutionalized party system. So, we acknowledge that many economic, social, and political factors affect political performance.
We also believe that the party system is a particularly important variable for determining the practice of presidential codings da alcolismo in Borisov. Even so, we claim that political performance is likely to be better when presidents have fewer powers. This suggests that codings da alcolismo in Borisov makers should consider the benefits of reforms that reduce the power of their presidency. We are aware that our conclusion assumes that institutions matter and, therefore, is susceptible to the problem of endogenous institutional choice, but we would like to address the endogeneity problem by arguing that even endogenously chosen weak presidents are better than endogenously chosen strong presidents.
In other words, we believe that there are benefits to be gained from the endogenous selection of weak presidents. We should endeavour to create the conditions for decision makers to calculate that their system would benefit from a weak presidency.
Fundamentally, if we are right that weak presidents bring benefits, we are unconcerned whether this outcome comes about endogenously or exogenously. That said, even if institutions are chosen endogenously, political actors still have to interpret the institutions with which they are faced. At some point, the economic, social, codings da alcolismo in Borisov political context is likely to change.